Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision by Craig Doidge et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL, OWNERSHIP,












We thank Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Mara Faccio, and Larry Lang for access to their ownership data;
William Megginson, as well as seminar participants at the University of Oklahoma for helpful comments;
and, Ivalina Kalcheva for excellent research assistance. Karolyi is grateful to the Dice Center for Financial
Economics for financial support. This research is supported by the NSF under Grant No. NSF-0215754.  The
views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
 © 2005 by Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, Karl V. Lins, Darius P. Miller, and René M. Stulz.  All rights
reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission
provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.  Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision
Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, Karl V. Lins, Darius P. Miller, and René M. Stulz
NBER Working Paper No. 11162
March 2005
JEL No. G15, G34, K00, P51
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates how a foreign firm’s decision to cross-list its shares in the U.S. is related to
the concentration of the ownership of its cash flow rights and of its control rights. Theory has
proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to list
their firm’s shares in the U.S. because the higher standards for transparency and disclosure, as well
as the increased monitoring associated with such listings, limit their ability to extract private
benefits. We offer evidence that confirms this hypothesis using data on more than 4,000 firms from
31 countries. Using logistic regression analysis, we show that the control rights held by controlling
shareholders, as well as the difference between their control rights and their cash flow rights are
significantly and negatively related to the existence of a U.S. listing. In addition, we employ duration
analysis using a Cox proportional-hazard model to show that the probability of listing in a given year
from 1995 to 2001, conditional on not yet having listed, is significantly lower for firms whose
managers have high levels of control and for firms whose controlling shareholder owns more control
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Academics and practitioners have developed extensive lists of reasons why foreign firms 
choose to list in the U.S. Benefits of access to U.S. markets that have been discussed include the 
increased ability to raise equity, growth of the firm’s shareholder base, increased liquidity, lower 
cost of capital, and greater visibility and prestige.
1 Recently, however, much attention has been paid 
to the corporate governance implications of U.S. cross-listings. 
Controlling shareholders of foreign firms listed in the U.S. face more constraints and have more 
obligations than controlling shareholders of firms not listed in the U.S.
2 For instance, a U.S. cross-
listing typically improves transparency by imposing disclosure requirements on firms that are 
stronger than the disclosure requirements they face in their home country. Additionally, by 
choosing to list in the U.S., controlling shareholders accept the consequence of being subject to an 
additional layer of monitoring by a variety of U.S. market intermediaries. For example, the cross-
listing subjects them to enforcement actions initiated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and to scrutiny from U.S. analysts and journalists. Further, if they raise funds in 
the U.S., these firms are subjected to monitoring by underwriters. This commitment to improve 
governance through greater transparency and monitoring is consistent with the existing evidence 
that firms experience positive abnormal returns when they announce their intention to list in the 
U.S. (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999), that they subsequently raise more capital after 
listing (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lins, Strickland, and Zenner, 2005), that their cost of capital is 
lower (Hail and Leuz, 2004), that estimates of private benefits of control are lower (Doidge, 2004a), 
                                                 
1 Surveys by Karolyi (1998, 2004), Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002), and Benos and Weisbach 
(2004) evaluate over 150 different published studies that examine the decision to cross-list shares on foreign 
markets. Some new studies focus on the importance of geographic proximity (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004) 
and product market linkages (Pagano, Roell, and Zechner, 2002) as factors in firms’ decisions about where 
and when to cross-list shares. 
2 Non-U.S. firms are typically controlled by large shareholders (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 
1999). We therefore use the term controlling shareholders to denote the group which controls the firm (which 
can include managers and/or large blockholders).   2
and that foreign firms listed in the U.S. are valued more highly than firms that do not list in the U.S. 
(Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). 
To the extent that control of a firm is valuable because it enables those who have it to extract 
private benefits from the firm, we would expect firms in which controlling shareholders have 
greater ownership of voting rights, and, therefore, tighter control of the firm, to be less likely to 
choose to list in the U.S. (see Coffee, 2002, for related arguments). We investigate this proposition 
using comprehensive ownership and control data on more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries in 
Asia, Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. The data include the control rights for controlling 
shareholders, such as top managers and their family members, governments, other corporations, and 
financial institutions. Using logistic regression analysis, we find strong evidence that when 
controlling shareholders have high levels of control, their firms are less likely to be listed in the 
U.S. Similarly, we find that firms controlled by their top managers and their families are less likely 
to be listed in the U.S. We also employ duration analysis using a Cox proportional-hazard model to 
show that the probability of listing in a given year over the 1995 to 2001 period, conditional on not 
yet having listed, is significantly lower when controlling shareholders have high levels of control 
and when firms are controlled by their top managers. 
The corporate governance literature makes an important distinction between ownership of 
voting rights and ownership of cash flow rights. If controlling shareholders have a majority of 
voting rights but own negligible cash flow rights, they have little incentive to take steps to increase 
the value of the firm’s equity. However, as controlling shareholders’ ownership of cash flow rights 
increases, any action they take to benefit themselves at the expense of other equity holders has a 
cost in that it decreases the value of the shares controlling shareholders own. If controlling 
shareholders own almost all of the cash flow rights, it makes little sense for them to expend 
resources to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. This reasoning 
suggests that, for a given level of cash flow rights, controlling shareholders are less likely to seek a   3
listing for their firm as their holdings of control rights exceed their holdings of cash flow rights. In 
both our logistic regression and Cox proportional hazard analysis, we find that this is the case. 
The relation between the listing decision and cash flow rights ownership is complex. If 
controlling shareholders own shares to control the firm and want to keep control, they have little to 
gain through a cross-listing. In such a situation, the cross-listing makes control less valuable and 
controlling shareholders cannot realize the share-price benefit from the reduced value of control by 
selling shares since by doing so they would lose control. At the same time, if controlling 
shareholders own shares for the purpose of aligning incentives with shareholders, incentives are 
well-aligned when controlling shareholders own a large stake so the benefit of cross-listing is 
smaller as long as controlling shareholders keep their current stake. If, however, the large stake 
controlling shareholders hold is costly to them – for instance, by forcing them to bear firm risk – 
and they want to reduce it, they can do so on better terms by cross-listing since controlling 
shareholders of a cross-listed firm are more constrained in their consumption of private benefits. 
With this view, it is possible that high cash flow ownership when the firm does not yet have a 
cross-listing makes a future cross listing more likely. We investigate this hypothesis explicitly with 
our Cox proportional-hazard model, but find no evidence that greater holdings of cash flow rights 
make it more likely for controlling shareholders to choose a cross-listing. Thus, the large equity 
stakes of controlling shareholders we observe in our sample firms are consistent with the view that 
control is an important motivation for holding these shares.  
To the extent that listing enables firms to raise funds at lower cost, we would expect, everything 
else equal, to see firms with better investment opportunities pursue listings and firms that have not 
yet listed to become more likely to do so following an improvement in their expected investment 
opportunities. We find strong support for these predictions. Also, controlling shareholders receive 
fewer private benefits in countries with better protection of investor rights (Nenova, 2003; Dyck   4
and Zingales, 2004). This suggests that, everything else equal, firms in countries with better 
investor protection would be more willing to cross-list. We find that this is the case. 
Our evidence contributes to both the literature on corporate ownership and the literature on 
cross-listings. The fact that controlling shareholders with more control rights are more reluctant to 
list provides further support for the view that a cross-listing reduces their discretion to take actions 
that reduce the wealth of minority shareholders. It does not, however, resolve the on-going debate 
about the exact nature of the constraints imposed on controlling shareholders. The predictions 
investigated in this model hold whenever such constraints exist and do not depend on whether the 
discretion of controlling shareholders is limited by the disclosure requirements and enforcement of 
U.S. securities laws (see Coffee, 1999 and 2002, and Stulz 1999, for arguments in favor of this 
hypothesis and Siegel, 2004, for arguments against), by monitoring of “gatekeepers” (see, in 
addition, Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003; King and Segal, 2004), or in other ways. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our data. In Section 3, we investigate 
whether the controlling shareholders’ control (i.e., voting) rights as well as the difference between 
their control rights and cash flow rights help further our understanding of which firms are cross-
listed among the population of firms. In Section 4, we estimate a Cox proportional-hazard model 
that allows us to relate the listing decision to changing firm attributes and to ownership. 
Conclusions follow in Section 5. 
 
2. Data. 
2.1. Sample description 
To examine whether firms’ decisions to cross-list on a U.S. exchange are related to firm-level 
corporate governance, we construct two separate datasets, each of which contains a different 
measure of the depth of ownership and control structure for a broad sample of firms from a large 
number of countries around the world. Our datasets are compiled from the raw ownership and   5
control data available for Western European firms from Faccio and Lang (2002); for emerging 
market firms from Lins (2003); and for East Asian firms from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000).
3 Ownership and control data for East Asian and emerging market firms are from the 1995 
and 1996 period and those from Western Europe range from 1996 to 1999, with the majority of 
sample observations occurring in 1996. We confine our analysis to non-financial firms to maintain 
consistency across the three ownership and control-structure datasets. Because we need a variety of 
firm-level financial data, we use only firms covered by the Worldscope database. Also, to make 
firms across countries more comparable, we limit our sample to firms with total assets of at least 
$10 million. 
Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Lins (2003) report ownership and control 
statistics that could proxy for a firm’s internal corporate governance environment. For instance, 
they compute the percentage of total ultimate control rights held by the following types of 
blockholders: Family/Management, Government, Widely-Held Corporations, Widely-Held 
Financials, and Miscellaneous (which includes ownership by Trusts, Cooperatives, Foundations, 
Employees, etc.). From these data it is possible to identify the largest blockholder of a firm’s 
control rights. Unfortunately, the cash flow ownership data presented in Faccio and Lang (2002), 
Lins (2003), and Claessens et al. (2000) are categorized using different algorithms. Faccio and Lang 
and Claessens et al. report the separation of ownership and control only for the largest blockholder 
of their sample firms (which may not be the family/management group), while Lins reports this 
                                                 
3 Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) examine the impact of ownership structure on firm value in East 
Asia. Fan and Wong (2002) examine the effect of ownership structure on earnings informativeness. Both 
studies exclude Japan from their tests based on the argument that Japan has a unique keiretsu governance 
system that features very little individual ownership or control and instead is dominated by widely held 
financial institutions who control a web of group-linked companies. Our empirical tests comprise a broader 
range of countries. While some countries arguably have unique characteristics, it is difficult for us to apply a 
consistent screening principle indicating uniqueness in country-level governance. Thus, we are reluctant to 
exclude any one country. However, later in the paper, we discuss results where we exclude Japan to follow 
Claessens et al. (2002). None of our inferences are weakened by removing Japan and some are strengthened. 
Two countries in our sample have many more firms than the other countries: the U.K. and Japan. Our 
inferences about the role of control rights and cash flow rights are robust to omitting these two countries.   6
measure for all holdings of the family/management group (which may not be the largest 
blockholder). Given these difficulties, we conduct our tests on two firm-level governance datasets. 
The first dataset is called the “Controlling Blockholder” dataset and it uses data for the ultimate 
control rights and cash flow rights held by the largest blockholder as detailed in Claessens et al. 
(2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). Our classification of the largest blockholder as the controlling 
shareholder follows much of the literature on international corporate governance (see, e.g., La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999 and Claessens et al., 2002). To make it clear that the 
largest blockholder is assumed to be the controlling shareholder in this dataset, we will call the 
controlling shareholder the controlling blockholder when this dataset is used. The primary benefit 
of this dataset is that we can conduct tests using the control rights held by the controlling 
blockholder as well as the difference between this entity’s control and cash flow rights. This allows 
us to focus on both the controlling blockholder’s capability to pursue its own agenda as well as the 
incentives to refrain from consumption of private benefits. One drawback of this dataset is that we 
have relatively few firms from emerging market countries. In particular, this dataset has no 
countries from Latin America. At the end of 1997, this dataset contains 4,062 firms across 22 
countries with complete firm-level data. 
Our second dataset is called the “Family/Management Control” dataset. In this dataset, we 
compile the ultimate control rights held by a firm’s officers, directors, top-level managers, and their 
family members. Since it is the management group that actually administers a firm, the private 
benefits of control may be especially pronounced when we observe high levels of control held by 
top managers and their families. Ultimate family/management control rights can consistently be 
identified across the datasets of Faccio and Lang (2002), Lins (2003), and Claessens et al. (2000). 
An advantage of this dataset is that we can include more firms from emerging market countries; the 
disadvantage is that we cannot consistently identify family/management cash flow rights. At the 
end of 1997, there are 4,272 firms from 31 countries in the Family/Management Control dataset.   7
In compiling the Family/Management Control dataset, we seek to construct measures that 
indicate that a firm’s managers are, in effect, in full control of a firm because, all else equal, the 
capability to expropriate minority shareholders will be highest when managers’ control of a firm 
cannot be challenged internally. Because effective managerial control depends on the control rights 
held by management, as well as the control rights held by outside blockholders, we use both a 
nominal and a relative measure of effective managerial control in our analysis. The nominal 
measure is the percentage of control rights held by the management group and its family. We 
expect that higher levels of managerial control rights correspond to more effective control of a firm. 
Our relative measure is an indicator variable set equal to one if the control rights held by a firm’s 
family/management group exceed those held by any other blockholding entity. The relative 
measure corresponds to the idea that high raw levels of control may not always be necessary to 
establish effective managerial control; rather, managers need only to obtain sufficient control rights 
so that they can avoid being influenced by other blockholders.
4 
We acknowledge that the Family/Management Control dataset allows us to focus only on the 
capability for expropriation and not on the incentives to avoid expropriation. To measure such 
incentives, we would need data for the ultimate cash flow ownership stakes held by the 
management group and its family for all of our firms, which we do not have.
5 However, it is 
possible that this limitation will not materially affect our inferences. To the extent that effective 
managerial control can be established at some level below 100 percent, control and cash flow rights 
will inherently be separated. Generally, managerial control of 51 percent of the shares will confer 
unequivocal control rights. In such a case, controlling managers that divert one dollar from the firm 
                                                 
4 Results using the nominal and relative measures are similar. We focus our presentation of results on the 
nominal family/management control rights measure because it corresponds more closely to the control rights 
variable used in the Controlling Blockholder dataset. 
5 While we do not have data to separate the effect of managerial cash flow rights from control rights, the 
analysis in Faccio and Lang (2002) and Lins (2003) suggests that, for our sample, ultimate managerial control 
rights often exceed cash flow rights because of pyramid ownership structures and superior voting shares.   8
for personal gain will bear at most 51 cents of the cost. Any further separation of control from cash 
flow rights via pyramids and superior voting shares may be a second-order effect. 
 
2.2. Variable definitions 
In each dataset, we compile a complete list of firms with Level 2 or Level 3 ADRs at the end of 
each year from 1995 to 2001. Firms with Level 2 or 3 ADRs are firms listed either on the Nasdaq, 
American Stock Exchange (Amex), or New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Level 3 ADR firms 
have also raised equity in the U.S. To determine whether a firm is listed on a U.S. exchange, we use 
information obtained from the Bank of New York, Citibank, the NYSE, and Nasdaq. Listing dates 
are verified using Lexis-Nexis searches and by examining firm’s annual reports as well as 20-Fs 
filed with the SEC. Firms that issue private placements via Rule 144a or firms that list via Level 1 
ADR programs are not included, as the SEC imposes few requirements on these firms and previous 
research shows that both the costs and the benefits are largest for exchange listings (see, e.g., 
Miller, 1999, Reese and Weisbach, 2002, Doidge et al., 2004, Hail and Leuz, 2004, and Lins, 
Strickland, and Zenner, 2005). 
In our analysis, we include a number of firm- and country-level control variables. At the firm 
level, we include an indicator variable that denotes the presence of an additional blockholder with 
at least 10 percent of the voting rights (“2
nd blockholder”). An additional large blockholder may 
serve to mitigate the actions of the controlling blockholder that are not in the interests of minority 
shareholders. However, it is also possible that the second blockholder’s non-trivial control stake 
could allow it to share some private benefits of control with the controlling blockholder. We control 
for growth opportunities using two proxies: sales growth over the last two years (“Sales growth”) 
and the median q of the global industry that a firm belongs to (“Global industry q”). We expect that 
controlling shareholders will be more likely to forgo private benefits of control if the need for 
external financing to fund growth opportunities is greater. Our sales growth proxy is a two-year   9
geometric average of annual inflation-adjusted growth in sales. Because Worldscope data for many 
countries is relatively sparse prior to 1994, this reduces our sample size by about 250 firms 
compared to using a one-year sales growth measure. For robustness, we re-estimate all of our 
models using a one-year sales growth measure and find results that are virtually identical in 
magnitude and significance. 
In addition to proxies for growth opportunities, we include “Leverage”, which is total debt 
divided by the total assets of the firm. Firms that have higher leverage (prior to listing) might be 
more likely to pursue a U.S. listing to raise new equity capital. Firm size, as proxied by the natural 
logarithm of total assets in U.S. dollars (“Log assets”), is included to control for the economies of 
scale in cross-listing. These economies of scale reflect the lower proportional fixed costs and 
potential benefits that increase with firm size. Firm profitability, as proxied by the return on assets 
(“ROA”), is included to control for the possibility that higher quality firms may be more likely to 
cross-list in order to signal their quality. We would expect firms with international activities to be 
more subject to the discipline resulting from cross-listing their shares in the U.S. For instance, it 
would be easier for minority shareholders to recover damages from a firm with U.S. assets than 
from one that has only domestic assets.
6 Further, firms with a larger presence in foreign product 
markets may be expected to pursue cross-listings as a complement to an overall strategy of 
internationalization (Pagano et al., 2002). As an indicator for the degree of international orientation, 
we include the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (“Foreign sales”).
7 Finally, we include an 
indicator variable that equals one if the state is a firm’s largest shareholder (“Government owned”) 
under the premise that governments might take into account different tradeoffs than private 
controlling shareholders. For instance, the government might be privatizing to raise funds, in which 
                                                 
6 See Siegel (2004). 
7 Similar to Pagano et al. (2002), we find that foreign sales data is missing for a significant fraction of the 
sample firms. Therefore, we follow the procedure they outline to impute missing values via regressions that 
generate predicted values of foreign sales – see footnote 22 on page 2678 in Pagano et al. for further details. 
For robustness, we repeat all of our regressions using the actual foreign sales data on a necessarily smaller 
sample. None of the results reported in the paper are affected.   10
case it might choose to cross-list in more liquid markets in order to increase the proceeds from the 
sale of shares.
8 
We also employ a number of country-level control variables. As noted earlier, controlling 
shareholders receive fewer private benefits in countries with better protection of investor rights. 
Therefore, we include proxies for investor protection in a firm’s home country. From La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (hereafter, LLSV), we use legal origin, the index of 
anti-director rights, and the index of judicial efficiency. LLSV (1998) assign each country to one of 
two legal traditions, Civil law or Common law. The anti-director rights index includes six different 
shareholder rights. The index is constructed by giving one point for each right so that it takes a 
value from 0 to 6, where a higher score indicates better shareholder protection. We also include the 
index of judicial efficiency which produces a rating of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business, particular foreign firms.” It takes a value from 0 to 10 and 
judicial efficiency is increasing in the score. We also create a variable “Anti-director * Judicial 
Efficiency” which is intended to capture both protection and enforcement. A similar variable has 
been used earlier in the literature, for instance by Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000). 
Finally, we also control for financial development and overall economic development. As a 
proxy for the level of financial development, we use the ratio of the total capitalization of domestic 
listed firms to GDP (“Stock market cap / GDP”). To control for the level of economic development, 
we use the log of GNP per capita. We use the historical three-year stock market correlation (weekly 
dollar-denominated returns) with the U.S. market index as a proxy for familiarity. 
                                                 
8 We do not consider separately privatized firms. Our dataset has 28 privatized firms. Eight firms privatize 
and list from 1995 to 2001. The Government owned dummy variable is equal to one for these firms.   11
2.3. Summary statistics 
We summarize basic firm-level governance statistics for each dataset in Table 1 and break these 
out based on whether or not the firm has an exchange listing in the U.S. as of year-end 1997.
9 Panel 
A shows that in the Controlling Blockholder dataset, 130 firms are listed on a U.S. exchange, while 
3,932 firms are not. Overall, we find that firms listed in the U.S. are significantly larger, as 
measured by total assets (in $ billions), than firms that are not listed (p-value of the t-test of 
equality of means across the two subsamples is less than 0.01). Panel A also shows that mean 
control rights held by the controlling blockholder are higher for firms that are not listed on a U.S. 
exchange (p-value equals 0.04), consistent with the idea that higher private benefits of control are 
associated with a lower likelihood to list on an exchange that requires more disclosure and subjects 
firms to greater potential monitoring. At the same time, mean cash flow rights held by the 
controlling blockholder are not significantly higher for the firms that are not listed (p-value equals 
0.11). Tests on differences between the medians of these variables for listed and non-listed 
subsamples show virtually identical significance levels. 
Another primary variable of interest in the Controlling Blockholder dataset is the separation of 
control and cash flow rights held by the largest blockholder. Theoretically, Bebchuk, Kraakman, 
and Triantis (2000) show that agency costs of controlling shareholders are higher when there is a 
separation of control rights and cash flow rights. Empirically, Claessens et al. (2002) find that 
separation of control rights and cash flow rights is associated with higher expected minority 
shareholder expropriation. To measure the “wedge” between control rights and cash flow rights, we 
use the percentage point difference in the control rights and cash flow rights held by the largest 
                                                 
9 In terms of coverage, the ownership datasets that we use are very comprehensive when compared to datasets 
used in other studies. However, we recognize that we do not have complete coverage for all firms that have 
financial data available in Worldscope, which leads to two potential concerns. First, in terms of firm 
characteristics, the firms for which we have ownership data may be different from firms for which we do not 
have ownership data. Lins (2003) addresses this issue and finds no significant differences between the two 
groups of firms. Second, requiring ownership data may have an impact on the fraction of firms that have a 
U.S. exchange listing in our study. To address this concern, we compare the dataset that is constrained to 
include ownership data to one that is not constrained. The mean (median) fraction of firms listed in the U.S. is 
similar in both samples and the differences across countries are not significant.   12
blockholder, which is also used by Claessens et al. (2002). Such a measure directly assesses the 
percentage of control rights held for which there are no corresponding cash flow consequences of 
exercising the control. 
In Panel A, we report the frequency with which the controlling blockholder’s control rights 
exceed its cash flow rights (for the sake of brevity, we do not report mean and median percentage 
point values for this separation, conditional upon such a separation being present). We find that a 
separation between control and cash flow rights occurs with greater frequency in firms that are not 
listed in the U.S. (p-value equals 0.05). To the extent that this separation proxies for an enhanced 
potential to consume private benefits of control, it is consistent with the idea that a significant 
number of controlling shareholders do not want to reduce their ability to extract private benefits of 
control by listing. Finally, the last column for each type of firm listed in Panel A also reports the 
percentage of firms with a secondary blockholder that holds at least 10 percent of a firm’s total 
control rights. There is no statistically significant difference in the frequency of the presence of a 
secondary blockholder between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms (p-value equals 0.46). 
In Panel B of Table 1, we report summary statistics for the Family/Management Control 
dataset. Similar to the Controlling Blockholder dataset, relatively few firms have a U.S. exchange 
listing (154 firms have a listing compared to 4,118 firms that do not), and those that are listed are 
much larger in size than those that are not (p-value less than 0.01). The panel also shows that mean 
and median levels of family/management control rights are significantly higher for firms that are 
not listed in the U.S. (30 percent versus 12 percent, p-value of difference is 0.00). Similarly, the 
frequency with which the family/management group holds the most control rights is significantly 
higher for firms that are not listed in the U.S. (p-value less than 0.01). 
Taken together, the summary statistics reported in Table 1 are consistent with our hypotheses 
that when controlling shareholders have more control rights and when there is a separation between 
control rights and cash flow rights, they are reluctant to subject themselves to the higher levels of   13
disclosure and monitoring associated with a U.S. listing. In the next section, we examine these 
hypotheses in more detail. 
 
3. The effect of ownership and control on the cross-listing decision. 
In this section, we examine whether ownership of cash flow rights and control rights are related 
to firms’ decisions to list in the U.S., after controlling for other firm-level variables as well as 
country-level variables. We first analyze the role of control rights held by the controlling 
blockholder or the top managers and their families in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 4, we examine 
whether firms in which the controlling blockholder has more control rights than cash flow rights are 
less likely to be listed on a U.S. exchange. 
To determine the relation between the control rights of blockholders and the probability of 
having a U.S. listing, we estimate a series of cross-sectional logistic regressions where the 
dependent variable, “Exchange”, is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is cross-listed on 
the Amex, Nasdaq, or the NYSE. The firm and country characteristics are measured as of the end of 
1997. As a robustness check, we repeat all of the regressions using data for 1996, and find similar 
results. In all models, we report marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent 
variables (marginal effects for the intercept are not computed or reported). Marginal effects for 
dummy variables are calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent 
variable as the dummy variable changes from a value of zero to one. The standard errors are 
computed assuming that observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. 
Our prediction is that the probability that a firm is listed in the U.S. is negatively related to the 
control rights held by the controlling blockholder. Since we estimate a cross-sectional regression, 
we do not consider the listing decision directly. The control rights held by the controlling 
blockholder we observe for listed firms are measured when the firm is already listed. Consequently, 
it is possible that holdings of control rights of controlling blockholders decreased after the listing.   14
The benefit of estimating cross-sectional regressions is that we can use all listed firms to estimate 
the relation between control rights of controlling blockholders and the listing status of a firm. In 
contrast, in regressions that examine the listing decision directly, we can use only firms that list 
after we observe ownership of control rights, which restricts the number of listed firms that we can 
include. 
In Table 2, we use the Controlling Blockholder dataset. In model (1), we regress the dummy 
variable, Exchange, on the percentage of voting rights held by the controlling blockholder (“Control 
rights”). The marginal effect for control rights is -0.0621 with a t-statistic of -2.03. Therefore, a one 
percentage point increase in the control rights held by the controlling blockholder decreases the 
probability of listing in the U.S. by 6.21 percent. Model (1) does not, however, control for other 
known determinants of a firm’s listing status. 
In model (2), we add a dummy variable for whether the firm has a second blockholder who 
holds at least 10 percent of control rights and control for firm characteristics. The marginal effect 
for the control rights of the largest blockholder continues to be negative and statistically significant 
(-0.0104, t-statistic = -2.99). The marginal effect on the dummy variable for the second blockholder 
is positive, but not significant. In addition, we find that many of the firm-level characteristics are 
important in explaining whether a firm has a listing in the U.S. For example, both Sales growth and 
Global industry q are positive and Global industry q is statistically significant. Sales growth is 
significant in all other models when we control for various country characteristics, though its 
economic importance is smaller than that of the control rights variable: a one percent increase in 
sales growth is associated with a 0.47 percent increase in the likelihood of listing.
10 The marginal 
effect on firm size (Log assets) is also positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis that larger firms are more likely to find the costs lower and the benefits larger for 
                                                 
10 It is difficult to compare the economic significance directly from the marginal effects without some sense 
of the unconditional distributional properties of the control variable. The median sales growth for the firms in 
our sample is 4.09 percent with an interquartile range of -1.7 percent to 12.5 percent. A one-percent change in 
sales growth is an economically large change spanning a difference of over 250 firms of our sample of 4,062.   15
cross-listing. Finally, firms with a more international orientation, as proxied by Foreign sales, are 
more likely to have a cross-listing; the economic importance of this relationship is strong with a one 
percent increase in foreign sales associated with approximately a one percent increase in listing 
likelihood.
11 Leverage, ROA, and the dummy variable for Government ownership are not 
significant. With all of these additional variables, the pseudo-R-squared of the logistic regressions 
increases sharply to 39 percent. 
In models (3) through (6) of Table 2, we add country-level variables as additional control 
variables. Model (7) replaces the country-level variables with individual country dummy variables. 
In every specification, the marginal effect on control rights remains negative and significant. Firm-
level characteristics that were significant in model (2) remain statistically significant in models (3) 
through (7). Further, the marginal effect for sales growth is always positive and significant, though 
it is modest in magnitude. In some specifications, the dummy variable for the existence of a second 
large blockholder is positive and significant. Although the results show that country-level 
characteristics do not subsume the effect of control rights in explaining the cross-listing status of a 
firm, there is some attenuation in the magnitude of the effect on control rights. Moreover, a number 
of the country-level control variables are significant. Consistent with our predictions, firms from 
Civil law countries and firms from countries that have lower shareholder protections (a lower Anti-
director rights index) are less likely to list in the U.S. (Doidge et al., 2004). Further, while the 
efficiency of the judicial system alone is not significantly related to the incidence of cross-listing, 
the interaction of anti-director and efficiency of the judicial system is positive and statistically 
significant. Therefore, cross-listings are more prevalent in countries where there exist both laws on 
the books and an efficient judicial system, which is consistent with the hypothesis that controlling 
                                                 
11 The median level of foreign sales is 10.7 percent with an interquartile range of 0 percent to 40.8 percent, so 
a one-percent change in foreign sales is a smaller economic event that is much more likely to occur than a 
similar change in sales growth.   16
blockholders are more likely to choose a U.S. listing if the value of private benefits is lower in their 
home country, keeping other firm characteristics the same. 
While Stock market capitalization to GDP is not significant, we find that the Log of GNP has a 
significantly negative effect. This suggests that firms from countries with lower economic 
development are more likely to have a cross-listing. We also include the correlation of the country’s 
market with the U.S. market as an explanatory variable. Stocks from countries that have a low 
correlation with the U.S. would offer greater diversification benefits to U.S. investors, so that a firm 
might benefit more from listing such a stock. We find that the coefficient on Correlation is positive 
and significant, which is inconsistent with this view. This is not surprising in light of the findings of 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004). They find that proximity is an important determinant of listing, but 
diversification benefits, as measured by market return correlations, are not. Highly correlated 
markets are often closer to each other geographically. 
Finally, model (7) indicates that the coefficient on Control rights remains negative and 
significant when the country characteristics are controlled for using country dummy variables. 
Overall, the evidence in Table 2 is consistent with our hypothesis that firms in which controlling 
blockholders have more control rights are less likely to list in the U.S. 
As mentioned previously, one drawback of the Controlling Blockholder dataset is that the 
largest blockholder is not always directly associated with the firm’s top management group or its 
controlling family. In Table 3, we use the Family/Management Control dataset to examine the 
effect of the management group and its family on the incidence of cross-listing. This dataset also 
allows us to examine a broader set of firms from both emerging and developed markets. The tests 
reported in Table 3 follow closely those reported in Table 2, but the variable of interest is the 
percentage of voting rights held by the management group or controlling family (“Family/Mgmt 
Control Rights”).   17
Overall, the results in Table 3 show that the higher the control rights held by the management 
group and its family, the less likely it is that the firm is listed. For example, model (1) shows that 
the marginal effect for Family/Mgmt Control rights is negative and significant (-0.066, t-statistic = -
2.41), which implies that a one percentage point increase in the control rights held by the 
family/management group decreases the probability of listing in the U.S. by 6.60 percent. When 
firm-level characteristics such as growth opportunities, firm size, international orientation, and 
profitability are added in model (2), we continue to find that the percent of control rights held by 
the management group and its family is negatively related to the incidence of cross-listing in the 
U.S. When country-level characteristics are added in models (3) through (7), we again see that the 
coefficient on Family/Mgmt Control rights is negative, and, in four of the five specifications, 
statistically significant. Again, we find that firms from countries with weak investor protection are 
less likely to list. Finally, when we replace country-level characteristics with individual country 
indicator variables, the marginal effect for Family/Mgmt Control rights is negative and significant 
(-0.0035, t-statistic = -1.68). 
The results contained in Tables 2 and 3 are supportive of our hypothesis that when the control 
rights held by blockholders are higher, firms are less likely to list in the U.S. We next turn to tests 
that use the Controlling Blockholder dataset to capture both the capability for expropriation as well 
as the incentives to avoid expropriation. 
Table 4 reports tests in which we examine the incidence of cross-listing as a function of the 
cash flow rights and of the difference between the control rights and cash flow rights (“Control – 
Cash”) of the controlling blockholder. Model (1) reports that the marginal effects for both Cash 
flow rights and Control – Cash are negative and significant. In terms of economic significance, a 
one percentage point increase in Control – Cash decreases the probability of listing in the U.S. by 
14.82 percent. Therefore, when the controlling blockholder bears less of the cash flow 
consequences of his actions, the firm is even less likely to be listed. Note that when there is no   18
separation between control rights and cash flow rights, the controlling blockholder must own 
substantial cash flow rights to exercise control. It is therefore possible that the negative coefficient 
on Cash flow rights is explained by the fact that, in many firms, there is no difference between cash 
flow rights and control rights, so that Cash flow rights proxies for the control exerted by the 
controlling blockholder. Hence, as the controlling blockholder has more control rights, he is more 
reluctant to give up some control by listing abroad. In the other models in Table 4, we follow our 
previous analysis in Table 2 and perform a battery of tests that control for both firm-specific and 
country-level characteristics. In every specification, the marginal effect for Control – Cash is 
negative and significant. The impact of firm and country-level variables in models (2) – (7) is 
similar to the results reported in Table 2 and we do not discuss it further here. 
To summarize the results from Tables 2 through 4, we find that when the control rights held by 
controlling shareholders are higher, firms are less likely to have a cross-listing in the U.S. This 
finding is robust to alternative definitions of the controlling shareholders and to firm and country-
level controls. In addition to the results with control rights, we find that when there is a larger 
separation of control rights and cash flow rights, firms are less likely to be listed. Further, we 
consistently find that firms with better growth opportunities, larger firms, firms with more 
international activity, and firms from countries with better investor protection are more likely to be 
listed in the U.S. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms in which 
controlling shareholders have the capability and the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders 
are less likely to subject themselves to the increased transparency and monitoring of a U.S. listing. 
We should also note that the economic magnitudes of the marginal effects are sizeable. In the next 
section, we estimate Cox models to investigate which characteristics help to predict firms’ listing 
decisions.   19
4. Predicting firms’ listing decisions using Cox proportional hazard models. 
In this section, we employ duration analysis using Cox (1972) proportional-hazard models to 
investigate the factors that affect firms’ listing decisions. Specifically, we model the probability of 
listing in year t, given that the firm has not yet listed, as a function of firm-level and country-level 
variables. The logistic regressions in Section 3 are estimated for 1997. These previous models allow 
us to study differences in the characteristics of firms that are listed in the U.S. and those that are not 
listed in the U.S., at a particular point in time. The Cox models that we employ in this section allow 
us to predict firms’ listing decisions in a panel setting, while allowing the independent variables to 
change over time. Similar approaches are used in Pagano et al. (2002) and Claessens, Klingebiel, 
and Schmukler (2003). As discussed earlier, the cost of this approach is a reduction in power since 
the number of firms that list over the relevant period in our sample is 58 in the Controlling 
Blockholder dataset and 67 in the Family/Management Control dataset. 
The Cox proportional-hazard model estimates the probability that a firm that has not yet listed 
in the U.S. will list in a given year. The hazard rate in the model is the instantaneous rate of listing 
for firms that have not yet listed. The model assumes that the hazard rate for firm j, h(t|xj ), is a 
function of the independent variables, xj and is written as,  
( ) () () x j j t h t h β x x exp 0 = , 
where βx, is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. The hazard function is composed of two 
separate parts. The first part, h0(t), is called the baseline hazard. It is obtained by setting x equal to 
zero so that the baseline hazard for firm j corresponds to the hazard rate with xj set to zero. The Cox 
model is a semi-parametric model in that βx is estimated without specifying the baseline hazard; 
that is, the model makes no assumptions about the nature or shape of the hazard function.
12 The 
                                                 
12 The baseline hazard cancels out of the partial likelihood function. Note also that the intercept is subsumed 
into the baseline hazard. Because the baseline hazard drops out, the Cox model has no intercept. If one 
knows, or is willing to make assumptions about, the form of the baseline hazard, parametric hazard models 
can be estimated. As a robustness check, we re-estimate all hazard models assuming an exponential 
distribution, i.e., the baseline hazard is constant. None of the results we report are affected.   20
second part, exp(xj βx) is called the relative hazard, and is a function of explanatory variables. The 
model is proportional in that the hazard is obtained by shifting the baseline hazard as the 
explanatory variables change. For example, firm j’s hazard is a multiplicative transformation of 
firm i’s hazard. Therefore, the model assumes that, whatever the shape of the baseline hazard, it is 
the same for all firms. 
In this “event time” experiment, we consider firms over the period from 1995 to 2001. In the 
Controlling Blockholder dataset, there are 4,589 firms with complete data. Of these firms, 58 listed 
on a U.S. exchange during this period. In the Family/Management Control dataset, there are 4,731 
firms, of which 67 list during this period. Once a firm lists in the U.S., it is no longer used in the 
model estimation. For example, if a firm lists in 1998, then it is included in the sample from 1995 
through 1998 and is excluded in subsequent years. Although our ownership data is observed at only 
one point in time, usually in 1995 or 1996, all other firm level variables are allowed to change each 
year. As such, we are assuming that firms’ ownership structures are constant, at least until they list 
in the U.S. The assumption that ownership structures are constant prior to listing is not overly 
restrictive given the general discussion in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that, in many countries, 
firms’ controlling shareholders change little over time and the specific quote in La Porta et al. 
(1999) that “ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable” (p. 475). Doidge (2004b) does show, 
however, that some controlling shareholders significantly decrease their ownership stakes and/or 
sell their control stakes after listing in the U.S. Because we exclude firms in the years after they 
have listed in the U.S., our analysis is not affected by possible changes in ownership after firms list 
in the U.S. 
We use the same set of firm-level and country-level variables that we used in Section 3. The 
difference in this section is that all firm-level variables are lagged by one year since we are trying to 
explain why a firm with specific characteristics at the end of one year chooses to list in the next 
year. For example, in 1996 we use 1995 values for sales growth, global industry q, total assets,   21
foreign sales, leverage, and ROA. The Cox model is estimated by maximizing the ‘partial’ 
likelihood function. We report the coefficients in exponentiated form. The advantage of 
exponentiated coefficients is that they can be interpreted as the effect of a unit change in the 
explanatory variable on the hazard. For example, an exponentiated coefficient of 1.2 (0.8) implies 
that a one unit increase (decrease) in the explanatory variable increases (decreases) the hazard by 20 
percent. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering across firms, so that we assume errors are 
independent across firms, but not across time. 
We begin by investigating the role of control rights on the listing decision. In Table 5, we 
report results using the control rights of the controlling blockholder as an explanatory variable in 
our model of the probability that a firm will list in the U.S. in a given year (the Controlling 
Blockholder dataset). We report results using the control rights of the family/management group as 
an explanatory variable in Table 6 (the Family/Management Control dataset).  
In model (1) of Table 5, the only explanatory variable in the estimated Cox model of the listing 
decision is the controlling blockholder’s control rights. The hazard ratio is 0.20 and is statistically 
significant different from one (t-statistic = -2.19).
13 A one unit increase in Control rights decreases 
the relative hazard by 80 percent. When we add firm-level variables in model (2), the hazard ratio 
increases to 0.28 and this coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level. The hazard ratio for the 
second large blockholder dummy variable is greater than one and is significant. This is consistent 
with the idea that the value of control is lower when there is a second large shareholder to monitor 
the actions of the controlling blockholder. When control is less valuable, the cost to the controlling 
shareholders of listing is lower and firms are more likely to list. 
Our first proxy for growth opportunities, Sales growth, has a hazard ratio greater than one 
(1.64), but is not significant. This weak finding may stem from its close correlation with other 
growth proxies. If we exclude Global industry q and ROA – both of which are significant in all 
                                                 
13 The null hypothesis can be written as H0: exp(βx) = 1 since hazard ratios equal one when the coefficients 
equal zero.   22
models – then Sales growth becomes statistically significant, and this is true for all models in this 
table. The hazard ratio for our second proxy for growth opportunities, Global industry q, is greater 
than one (3.65) and is significant. Therefore, the evidence is consistent with the argument that 
higher growth opportunities increase the probability of listing. Large firms, those with more 
international activity in terms of foreign sales, and more profitable firms are also more likely to list: 
the hazard ratios for total assets (2.23), foreign sales (12.18), and ROA (1.02) are all greater than 
one and are statistically significant. Contrary to what we might expect, but consistent with our logit 
regression analysis in Tables 2 through 4, firms with higher leverage are not more likely to list. 
Finally, whether or not a firm is controlled by the state does not have a material impact on the 
listing decision. 
In models (3) – (6) we add country-level variables to model (2).
14 When we add country-level 
variables, the hazard ratio on Control rights is still less than one, but becomes statistically 
insignificant. At the same time, the hazard ratio on the dummy for a second blockholder remains 
both greater than one and significant. The only country-level variable that is significant is the 
correlation with the U.S. market. The investor protection variables, stock market capitalization to 
GDP, and log of GNP per capita are not significant. This is a surprising contrast from our results in 
the logistic regressions of Tables 3 and 4 in which correlation with the U.S. market was a weaker 
factor compared to the investor protection variables and log of GNP per capita. 
Why do country controls reduce the significance on control rights? Further investigation reveals 
that it is the investor protection proxies (the civil law dummy and the anti-director rights variable) 
that reduce the significance of Control rights. Given the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) that 
                                                 
14 We cannot control for country effects using country dummies in these models. Suppose that from 1995 to 
1997, there are no cross-listed firms from a given country. The dummy variable for that country then 
perfectly predicts the exchange listed dummy variable for those years. In 1998, if one firm lists, then the 
dummy variable no longer perfectly predicts the exchange listed dummy and we could use the country 
dummy. However, it does not make sense to estimate the model with no country dummy from 1995 to 1997 
and then add one for 1998 to 2001. The other possibility is to estimate the model excluding the country 
dummy for the entire sample period. The problem with such an approach is that we do not control for country 
effects for that country.   23
investor protection and ownership concentration are related, this is not surprising. Finally, we note 
that if we exclude Japan (see footnote 3 in Section 2), Control rights is always significant. Further, 
the hazard ratio for the Civil law dummy is less than one and is significant, while the hazard ratio 
for Anti-director is greater than one and is significant – firms from countries with weaker investor 
protection are less likely to list in the U.S. Because Japan accounts for a large fraction of the sample 
and very few firms from Japan are listed in the U.S., including or excluding Japan has an impact on 
some of our conclusions.
15 
We next turn to the results using the control rights of the family/management group in Table 6. 
As noted earlier, a potential advantage of this analysis is that the effect of control rights on cross-
listing may be sharpest in firms for which we can be certain the controlling shareholder is part of 
the management group or its family. Model (1) begins by including just the family/management 
group’s control rights. The hazard ratio is 0.17 and is significant (t-statistic = -3.13). As we would 
expect, an increase in control rights decreases the probability of listing. In model (2) we add firm-
level control variables. The hazard ratio for the Family/Management Control rights remains 
significant and only increases slightly in magnitude to around 0.20. In addition, the hazard ratios for 
sales growth, global industry q, assets, foreign sales, and ROA are all greater than one, as expected, 
and are statistically significant. The only firm-level variable that is not significant is leverage, as 
before in Table 5. 
When we add country-level variables in models (3)-(6), none of the results in model (2) are 
affected. The Civil law dummy and Anti-director variables have the expected signs, but are not 
significant. As in Table 5, if we exclude Japan, the investor protection variables become significant 
so that firms from countries with weaker investor protection are less likely to list. Stock market 
capitalization to GDP is not significant. However, the hazard ratio for the log of GNP per capita is 
less than one and is significant while that for the correlation with the U.S. market is greater than 
                                                 
15 When Japan is included, there are a total 4,589 firms of which 58 list over the sample period. When we 
exclude Japan, there are a total of 3,713 firms, of which 54 list over the sample period.   24
one and is significant. Firms from less developed countries and firms from countries that are more 
correlated with the U.S. markets are more likely to list in the U.S. 
If the controlling blockholder has control of the firm, but owns very little of the cash flow 
rights, it has few incentives to take any action to reduce expropriation from minority shareholders 
and to increase the value of the firm’s equity. If the controlling blockholder holds a large cash-flow 
stake in the firm, it bears a large fraction of the cost of expropriating minority shareholders. 
Therefore, for a given cash flow stake, we expect that controlling blockholders who hold more 
control rights relative to their cash flow rights are less likely to list in the U.S. We investigate this 
hypothesis in Table 7 using the Controlling Blockholder dataset. 
Model (1) includes the controlling blockholder’s cash flow rights and the difference between 
the controlling blockholder’s control rights and its cash flow rights (“Control – Cash”). The hazard 
ratio for Cash flow rights is less than one and is significant. The hazard ratio for Control – Cash is 
less than one but is not significant. However, this specification does not control for other firm 
characteristics. When we control for firm characteristics in model (2), we see that while the hazard 
ratio for Cash flow rights is still less than one, it is no longer significant; however, the hazard ratio 
for Control – Cash is 0.01 and becomes statistically significant (t-statistic = -2.43). A one unit 
increase in Control – Cash decreases the hazard by 99 percent. In addition, the hazard for second 
blockholder is greater than one and is statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with the 
argument that controlling blockholders are less likely to list in the U.S. when their private benefits 
are higher. The hazard ratio for Sales growth is greater than one, but is not significant (it is 
significant if Global industry q and ROA are excluded). Our other proxy for growth opportunities, 
Global industry q, is significant so that, once again, we see that firms with better growth 
opportunities are more likely to list. In addition, larger firms, firms with more international activity, 
and more profitable firms are more likely to list. The other firm-level variables, Leverage, and the 
government ownership dummy do not have a significant impact on the listing decision.   25
  In models (3) – (6) we again add country-level controls. The first thing to note is that none 
of the firm-level variables are affected. Control – Cash and the second blockholder dummy remain 
statistically significant in all specifications. As in Table 5, the investor protection proxies have the 
correct sign, but are not statistically significant. However, if we exclude Japan (which, as 
mentioned, accounts for a large fraction of the sample, but has very few listing firms) the investor 
protection variables become significant. Stock market capitalization to GDP and log of GNP per 
capita are not significant. As before, the correlation with the U.S. has a positive impact on the 
probability of listing. 
  Finally, we investigate, but do not report, the possibility of a nonlinear impact on the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights on the listing decision. For example, small 
differences may not have a major impact on incentives to cross-list in the U.S., but a larger 
difference might. One simple nonlinear specification that we considered is the squared difference 
between control rights and cash flow rights. However, for many firms the difference is zero, so that 
the squared term is highly correlated with the linear term. Therefore, we estimate a model that is 
piecewise linear in the difference between control rights and cash flow rights, allowing for one 
change in the slope. Because choosing a point at which the slopes change is fairly arbitrary, we try 
a number of different cutoff points. For example, when we use a cutoff at 5 percent with the full set 
of control variables, the hazard ratio for Cash flow rights is 0.44, but is not significant.
16 The hazard 
ratio for Control – Cash from 0 to 5 percent is 0.42 and is not significant. The hazard ratio for 
Control – Cash greater than 5 percent declines to 0.007 and is significant at the 10 percent level. 
When we use a 10 percent cutoff, the hazard ratio for Control – Cash from zero to 10 percent is 
0.31 and is not significant. The hazard ratio for Control – Cash greater than 10 percent is 0.001 and 
is significant at the 10 percent level. Overall, the evidence suggests that the difference between 
                                                 
16 Recall from Table 1 that the Control – Cash difference is zero for the majority of the firms and that a 5 
percent cutoff is almost associated with the 75
th quantile of our sample of firms and it rises to a maximum 
value of 34 percent.   26
control rights and cash flow rights has a nonlinear impact on firm’s listing decisions, but the exact 
form of this nonlinear relationship is somewhat unclear. 
 
5. Conclusions. 
Recent research has shown that the private benefits of control are especially valuable in 
countries with weak investor protection. A related stream of research finds that the decision to 
cross-list in the U.S. is value enhancing and concludes that the cross-listing premium arises from 
firms’ commitments to improved disclosure and corporate governance, as well as additional 
scrutiny by various reputational intermediaries. However, despite the benefits of cross-listing, it is 
well-known that many non-U.S. firms do not cross-list their shares in the U.S. One explanation is 
that the controlling shareholders of firms that choose not to list have valuable private benefits that 
they do not want to give up. We investigate and find evidence in support of this hypothesis in this 
paper. 
Using two separate databases of ownership structure for over 4,000 firms from 31 countries 
around the world, we construct proxy measures of private benefits of control and find that, when 
controlling shareholders have high levels of control and when their control rights exceed their cash 
flow rights, their firms are less likely to list their shares in the U.S. Similarly, we find that firms 
controlled by their top managers and their families are less likely to have a U.S listing. We also find 
an important role for other firm-level variables, such as growth opportunities and size, as well 
country-level variables, such as home country investor protections, in modeling the costs and 
benefits of listing. We employ duration analysis using a Cox proportional-hazard model to show 
that the probability of listing in a given year over the 1995 to 2001 period, conditional on not yet 
having listed, is significantly lower when controlling shareholders have higher levels of control, 
when their control rights exceed their cash flow rights, and when firms are controlled by their top 
managers. Taken together, our results indicate that a desire to either consume private benefits of   27
control, or to retain the option to consume such benefits, deters the controlling shareholders of 
many non-U.S. firms from listing in the U.S.   28
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Table 2. Cross-sectional logits: controlling blockholder’s control rights. 
The logit regressions estimate the probability that a firm has a level 2 or level 3 ADR on December 31, 1997. 
The table reports marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables and t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of 
the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. Data sources for information on U.S. 
listings and ownership are described in Section 2. Firms that list via Rule 144a and Level 1 ADRs are excluded 
and firms with assets < $10 million are excluded. Control rights is equal to the voting rights held by the 
controlling shareholder. Second blockholder equals one if there is another blockholder with at least 10% of the 
voting rights. Government owned equals one if the state is the controlling shareholder. All accounting data is 
from Worldscope. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth. Global industry q is the firm’s 
median global industry q. Total assets are in $ thousands. Foreign sales is the percentage of foreign sales to total 
sales. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Civil law, anti-director, and efficiency of judicial are from 
LLSV (1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) is from the World Bank WDI Database. Stock market capitalization to 
GDP is from Beck et al. (2001). Correlation with U.S. market is calculated using weekly data over the previous 
three years: it is the correlation of the Datastream local stock market index returns (in $) with the U.S. stock 
market index returns. Pseudo-R
2 is a goodness-of-fit measure for binary choice models based on the difference 
between unrestricted and restricted likelihood functions. The standard errors are computed assuming 
observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 










nd  blockholder    0.0022 0.0010 0.0018 0.0011 0.0018 0.0013 




Sales growth    0.0047  0.0035 0.0039 0.0038 0.0038 0.0021 






Global industry q    0.0117  0.0092 0.0078 0.0104 0.0077 0.0063 







Log assets    0.0053  0.0043 0.0040 0.0047 0.0040 0.0032 







Foreign sales    0.0127  0.0089 0.0092 0.0097 0.0091 0.0054 







Leverage   -0.0050  -0.0025  -0.0036 -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0025 
    -(1.30) -(0.51) -(0.83) -(0.53) -(0.89) -(0.58) 
ROA    0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    (1.18) (0.21) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) 
Government owned    0.0018 0.0018 0.0021 0.0014 0.0021 0.0020 
    (0.88) (0.85) (1.09) (0.58) (1.07) (1.22) 
Civil  law     -0.0110      
     -(2.35)
**      
Anti-director      0.0021     
      (2.58)
***     
Efficiency  of  judicial       0.0008    
       (0.61)    
Anti-director*Eff.  of  judicial        0.0002   
        ( 2 . 8 0 )
***  
Stock market cap / GDP      -0.0023  -0.0013  0.0011  -0.0021   
     -(1.24)  (0.74)  (0.53)  -(1.05)   
Log of GNP per capita      -0.002  -0.0033  -0.0048  -0.0041   





Correlation with U.S. market      0.0122 0.0153 0.0194 0.0152   




Country  dummies  no no no no no no yes 
Number  of  observations  4062 4062 4062 4062 4062 4062 4062 
Pseudo R
2  0.02 0.39 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.48   34
Table 3. Cross-sectional logits: family/management control rights. 
The logit regressions estimate the probability that a firm has a level 2 or level 3 ADR on December 31, 1997. 
The table reports marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables and t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Data sources for information on U.S. listings and ownership are described in Section 2. Firms that 
list via Rule 144a and Level 1 ADRs are excluded and firms with assets < $10 million are excluded. 
Family/Mgmt control rights is the fraction of voting rights held by the management group or controlling family. 
All accounting data is from Worldscope. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth. Global 
industry q is the firm’s median global industry q. Total assets are in $ thousands. Foreign sales is the percentage 
of foreign sales to total sales. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Civil law, anti-director, and 
efficiency of judicial are from LLSV (1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) is from the World Bank WDI Database. 
Stock market capitalization to GDP is from Beck et al. (2001). Correlation with the U.S. market is calculated 
using weekly data over the previous three years: it is the correlation of the Datastream local stock market index 
returns (in $) with the U.S. stock market index returns. Pseudo-R
2 is a goodness-of-fit measure for binary choice 
models based on the difference between unrestricted and restricted likelihood functions. The standard errors are 
computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 








Sales growth    0.0057  0.0043 0.0051 0.0042 0.0048 0.0030 





Global industry q    0.0168  0.0134 0.0115 0.0146 0.0113 0.0069 







Log assets    0.0073  0.0058 0.0053 0.0060 0.0052 0.0035 







Foreign sales    0.0159  0.0120 0.0132 0.0126 0.0126 0.0065 







Leverage   -0.0076  -0.0044  -0.0048 -0.0041 -0.0057 -0.0033 
    -(1.50) -(0.74) -(0.88) -(0.64) -(1.07) -(0.73) 
ROA    0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
    (1.63) (0.54) (0.27) (0.37) (0.30) (0.07) 
Civil  law     -0.0124      
     -(1.82)
*      
Anti-director      0.0029     
      (2.51)
**     
Efficiency  of  judicial       0.0021    
       (1.19)    
Anti-director*Eff.  of  judicial        0.0003   
        ( 2 . 6 1 )
***  
Stock market cap / GDP      -0.0039  -0.0030  -0.0011  -0.0044   
      -(1.20) -(1.17) -(0.38) -(1.43)   
Log of GNP per capita      -0.0045  -0.0056  -0.0095  -0.0072   





Correlation with U.S. market      0.0180 0.0207 0.0269 0.0204   





Country  dummies  no no no no no no yes 
Number  of  observations  4272 4272 4272 4272 4272 4272 4272 
Pseudo R
2  0.03 0.35 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.48   35
Table 4. Cross-sectional logits: difference between controlling blockholder’s control and cash flow rights. 
The logit regressions estimate the probability that a firm has a level 2 or level 3 ADR on December 31, 1997. 
The table reports marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables and t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of 
the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. Data sources for information on U.S. 
listings and ownership are described in Section 2. Firms that list via Rule 144a and Level 1 ADRs are excluded 
and firms with assets < $10 million are excluded. Cash flow (control) rights is equal to the fraction of cash flow 
(voting) rights held by the controlling shareholder. Control – Cash is control rights minus cash flow rights. 
Second blockholder equals one if there is another blockholder with at least 10% of the voting rights. 
Government owned equals one if the state is the controlling shareholder. All accounting data is from 
Worldscope. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth. Global industry q is the firm’s median 
global industry q. Total assets are in $ thousands. Foreign sales is the percentage of foreign sales to total sales. 
Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Civil law, anti-director, and efficiency of judicial are from LLSV 
(1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) is from the World Bank WDI Database. Stock market capitalization to GDP 
is from Beck et al. (2001). Correlation with the U.S. market is calculated using weekly data over the previous 
three years: it is the correlation of the Datastream local stock market index returns (in $) with the U.S. stock 
market index returns. Pseudo-R
2 is a goodness-of-fit measure for binary choice models based on the difference 
between unrestricted and restricted likelihood functions. The standard errors are computed assuming 
observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



















nd blockholder    0.0022 0.0011 0.0017 0.0012 0.0017 0.0012
   (1.63) (0.94) (2.09)
** (0.91)  (2.06)
**  (2.68)
***
Sales growth    0.0045 0.0035 0.0039 0.0038 0.0038 0.0020






Global industry q    0.0109 0.0087 0.0076 0.0096 0.0076 0.0061







Log assets    0.0051 0.0042 0.0040 0.0046 0.0040 0.0032







Foreign sales    0.0125 0.0089 0.0093 0.0096 0.0092 0.0054







Leverage    -0.0051 -0.0028 -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0025
   - (1.38) -(0.59) -(0.84) -(0.63) - (0.91) - (0.59)
ROA    0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   (1.24) (0.26) (0.16) (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.12)
Government owned    0.0011 0.0012 0.0015 0.0008 0.0014 0.0012
   (0.72) (0.76) (1.09) (0.41)  (1.04)  (1.15)
Civil law    -0.0065  
   - (3.36)
***  
Anti-director   0.0019  
  (2.33)
**  
Efficiency of judicial   0.0008   
   (0.66)  
Anti-director*Eff. of judicial   0.0002 
   (2.48)
** 
Stock market cap / GDP    -0.0021 -0.0011 0.0009  -0.0018 
   - (1.15) -(0.60) (0.49) - (0.90) 
Log of GNP per capita   -0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0048  -0.004 





Correlation with U.S. market   0.0108 0.0145 0.0170  0.0143 
   (1.41) (1.81)
* (1.47)  (1.88)
* 
Country  dummies  no no no no no no yes
Number  of  observations  4062 4062 4062 4062 4062 4062 4062
Pseudo R
2  0.03 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.48
   36
Table 5. Cox models: controlling blockholder’s control rights. 
The Cox models estimate the probability of listing in year t, given that the firm has not listed yet. The sample 
includes observations on the dependent variable from 1995 to 2001. Data sources for information on U.S. 
listings and ownership are described in Section 2. Firms that list via Rule 144a and Level 1 ADRs are excluded 
and firms with assets < $10 million are excluded. The table presents results using the Controlling Blockholder 
dataset. Control rights is equal to the fraction of voting rights held by the controlling shareholder. Second 
blockholder equals one if there is another blockholder with at least 10% of the voting rights. Government 
owned equals one if the state is the controlling shareholder. All accounting data is from Worldscope. Sales 
growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth. Global industry q is the firm’s median global industry q. 
Total assets are in $ millions. Foreign sales is the percentage of sales that are foreign. Leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets. Civil law, anti-director, and efficiency of judicial are from LLSV (1998). Log of GNP 
per capita ($) is from the World Bank WDI Database. Stock market capitalization to GDP is from Beck et al. 
(2001). Correlation with the U.S. market is calculated using weekly data over the previous three years: it is the 
correlation of the Datastream local stock market index returns (in $) with the U.S. stock market index returns. 
The table reports hazard ratios (i.e., exp(βx), not βx). The model does not estimate a constant. The standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on firms – they are computed assuming observations are independent across 
firms, but not across time. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are for the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
is equal to one. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
    # of subjects: 4,589       
    # of failures: 58       
    Time at risk: 22,276  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Control rights  0.20 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.31 
  -(2.19)
** -(1.68)
* -(1.45) -(1.44) -(1.55) -(1.42) 
2
nd blockholder    1.82 1.81 1.85 1.76 1.82 






Sales growth    1.64 1.49 1.49 1.46 1.48 
    (0.77) (0.59) (0.58) (0.53) (0.57) 
Global industry q    3.65 4.37 4.32 4.54 4.37 






Log assets    2.23 2.38 2.37 2.33 2.36 






Foreign sales    12.18  9.11 9.02 8.19 8.83 






Leverage    0.30 0.52 0.49 0.55 0.50 
    -(1.16) -(0.56) -(0.59) -(0.50) -(0.58) 
ROA    1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 






Government owned    1.03 1.02 0.97 0.97 0.97 
    (0.07)  (0.04) -(0.07) -(0.08) -(0.07) 
Civil law     0.60     
     -(1.08)     
Anti-director      1.09    
      (0.67)    
Efficiency of judicial       1.03   
       (0.15)   
Anti-director*Eff. of judicial        1.01 
        ( 0 . 5 2 )  
Stock market cap / GDP      1.12 1.25 1.35 1.26 
      (0.46) (1.00) (1.48) (0.99) 
Log of GNP per capita      0.87 0.75 0.72 0.73 
      -(0.56) -(1.35) -(1.11) -(1.45) 
Correlation with U.S. market      13.62 22.13 24.08 22.55 





Log likelihood  -473.17 -383.87 -378.20 -378.53 -378.78 -378.62 
χ
2  4.80  221.53 209.06 220.28 225.51 218.18 
Prob > χ
2  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   37
Table 6. Cox models: family/management control rights. 
The Cox models estimate the probability of listing in year t, given that the firm has not listed yet. The sample 
includes observations on the dependent variable from 1995 to 2001. Data sources for information on U.S. listings 
and ownership are described in Section 2. Firms that list via Rule 144a and Level 1 ADRs are excluded and firms 
with assets < $10 million are excluded. The table presents results for the Family/Managment Control dataset. 
Family/Mgmt control rights is the voting rights held by the management group or controlling family. All 
accounting data is from Worldscope. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth. Global industry q is 
the firm’s median global industry q. Total assets are in $ thousands. Foreign sales is the percentage of foreign 
sales to total sales. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Civil law, anti-director, and efficiency of judicial 
are from LLSV (1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) is from the World Bank WDI Database. Stock market 
capitalization to GDP is from Beck et al. (2001). Correlation with the U.S. market is calculated using weekly data 
over the previous three years: it is the correlation of the Datastream local stock market index returns (in $) with 
the U.S. stock market index returns. The table reports hazard ratios (i.e., exp(βx), not βx). The model does not 
estimate a constant. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on firms – they are computed assuming 
observations are independent across firms, but not across time. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are for the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to one. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. 
    # of subjects: 4,731       
    # of failures: 67       
    Time at risk: 23,164  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








Sales growth    2.90 2.18 2.19 2.23 2.19 






Global industry q    2.66 3.80 3.74 3.83 3.77 






Log assets    2.11 2.27 2.27 2.28 2.27 






Foreign sales    8.60 7.32 7.45 7.27 7.37 






Leverage    0.25 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.48 
    -(1.49) -(0.70) -(0.72) -(0.65) -(0.72) 
ROA    1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 






Civil law     0.86     
     -(0.32)     
Anti-director      1.05    
      (0.46)    
Efficiency of judicial       1.10   
       (0.57)   
Anti-director*Eff. of judicial        1.00 
        ( 0 . 2 6 )  
Stock market cap / GDP      1.14 1.14 1.10 1.17 
      (0.49) (0.58) (0.38) (0.59) 
Log of GNP per capita      0.47 0.46 0.40 0.45 





Correlation with U.S. market      19.77 22.00 24.18 22.19 





Log likelihood  -546.87 -459.09 -447.31 -447.26 -447.17 -447.33 
χ
2  9.79  205.52 229.44 231.04 227.63  229.1 
Prob > χ
2  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   38
Table 7. Cox models: difference between controlling blockholder’s control and cash flow rights. 
The Cox models estimate the probability of listing in year t, given that the firm has not listed yet. The sample 
includes observations on the dependent variable from 1995 to 2001. Data sources for information on U.S. 
listings and ownership are described in Section 2. Firms that list via Rule 144a and Level 1 ADRs are excluded 
and firms with assets < $10 million are excluded. The table presents results using the Controlling Blockholder 
dataset. Cash flow (control) rights is equal to the cash flow (voting rights) held by the controlling shareholder. 
Control – Cash is control rights minus cash flow rights. Second blockholder equals one if there is another 
blockholder with at least 10% of the voting rights. Government owned equals one if the state is the controlling 
shareholder. All accounting data is from Worldscope. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth. 
Global industry q is the firm’s median global industry q. Total assets are in $ thousands. Foreign sales is the 
percentage of sales that are foreign. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Civil law, anti-director, and 
efficiency of judicial are from LLSV (1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) is from the World Bank WDI Database. 
Stock market capitalization to GDP is from Beck et al. (2001). Correlation with the U.S. market is calculated 
using weekly data over the previous three years: it is the correlation of the Datastream local stock market index 
returns (in $) with the U.S. stock market index returns. The table reports hazard ratios (i.e., exp(βx), not βx). The 
model does not estimate a constant. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on firms – they are computed 
assuming observations are independent across firms, but not across time. The t-statistics reported in parentheses 
are for the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to one. *, **, and *** indicate statistical  significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
    # of subjects: 4,589     
    # of failures: 58       
    Time at risk: 22,276  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Cash flow rights  0.21 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.37 0.39
 - (2.04)
** -(1.23) -(1.09) -(1.21) -(1.21) - (1.17)
Control –  Cash  0.11 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02







nd blockholder   2.01 1.96 1.96 1.91  1.95






Sales growth   1.90 1.70 1.66 1.66  1.66
   (0.99) (0.78) (0.74) (0.71)  (0.73)
Global industry q   3.46 4.13 4.17 4.29  4.19






Log assets    2.27 2.42 2.39 2.37  2.38






Foreign sales    12.72 9.72 9.25 8.74  9.16






Leverage   0.30 0.48 0.49 0.52  0.49
   - (1.19) -(0.63) -(0.61) -(0.56) - (0.61)
ROA   1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02  1.02






Government owned   0.97 0.97 0.94 0.93  0.94
   - (0.07) -(0.07) -(0.16) -(0.18) - (0.17)
Civil law    0.60  
   - (1.07)  
Anti-director   1.06  
   (0.45)  
Efficiency of judicial   1.03 
   (0.14) 
Anti-director*Eff. of judicial     1.00
     (0.35)
Stock market cap / GDP    1.12 1.29 1.34  1.30
   (0.43) (1.16) (1.45)  (1.12)
Log of GNP per capita   0.87 0.75 0.72  0.74
   - (0.58) -(1.36) -(1.09) - (1.41)
Correlation with U.S. market   11.15 18.85 19.73  18.97





Log likelihood -473.13 -382.22 -377.05 -377.53 -377.62  -377.56
χ
2 5.33  260.20 241.16 248.65 261.25  248.89
Prob > χ
2  0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 